Name: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Block: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Note taking Form:

**Use one per source**

**Type of Source: (video, article, research):**

**Article**

**Name, author, publisher of Source:**

Ideology and Electricity: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

Rodric Braithwaite, Jonathan Steele and Artemy Kalinovsky analyze the forgotten history of Afghan communism and the Soviet occupation.

**Web Address:**

**http://www.thenation.com/article/167440/ideology-and-electricity-soviet-experience-afghanistan#**

**Notes: (what you consider to be the most important or interesting parts of the source)**

* Najibullah joined the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in the late 1960s
* **After Soviet withdrawal from Afghan, Nijibullah (president )had the power**
* **“Everything worked well and Kabul was clean.”**
* “Najib fought Pakistan.” remembered not so much as a socialist—a vague term for many in Afghanistan—but as a modernizer and a patriot.
* **The strategy and tactics help to know about the Soviet experience in afghan**
* terror and suffering, and the ideals and goals that motivated the Afghan communists and their Soviet allies
* a veteran of cold war–era diplomacy served as the British ambassador during the Soviet Union’s collapse
* has recently published an excellent and sympathetic account of the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan
* Afghansy, takes title from Russian nickname for Afghan war vets, Sober and balances antidote to the propaganda and deception
* Afgantsy Braithwaite had considerable access to government archives in Russia and key players from the Soviet-Afghan war, and traveled to Kabul to dig even further
* Steele’s book was impressive when analyzing the forgotten history of Afghan communism and the Soviet occupation
* Soviet fought Muslim rebels in central Asian borderlands 1920s
* stability in Afghanistan was seen as the key to security in Soviet Central Asia
* Afghan was one of the top four recipients of Soviet aid
* Moscow sent engineers to Afghanistan and invited thousands of Afghan students, technicians and military officers to Russia for training
* 1950s, the United States had also started investing in Afghan, sparking an aid-driven competition between the superpowers
* The infrastructure of the Kabul airport was Russian-built; its electronics, communications and radar were American imports
* Military officers who trained in the USSR ended up as early leaders of the mujahedeen: one was Ishmail Khan. Some of the US-trained intellectuals became communists and government officials
* Daoud pursued what was then a standard set of economic policies, using state planning and investment to build up private industry and internal markets
* handled his political enemies—the mutually antagonistic Islamists and communists—with a mix of repression and co-optation
* Steele notes, “a hastily improvised affair
* Fearing wholesale liquidation, communist officers in the military attacked the presidential palace, murdered Daoud and seized power.
* Soviet official “distinctly uneasy about what had happened,”
* Soviet view, Afghanistan was not ready for socialism, nor was the PDPS prepared to govern
* PDPA was composed of two bitterly opposed factions.
* The larger, more impatiently radical one, the Khalq (meaning “nation”), had staged the coup
* The smaller, more moderate faction, the Parcham (meaning “banner”)
* Daoud political allies and two prime minister was executes
* As the violence mounted, the Soviets grew increasingly worried
* \*\*Old communism explain resistance “Peasants were happy at first, but when they heard we were communists, they changed. The whole world was against us. They said we don’t believe in Islam, and they weren’t wrong. They could see we didn’t pray. We liberated women from having to pay dowry, and they said we believed in free love.” \*\*
* Steele: “In power [party leaders] wanted to eradicate literacy within five years. It was ridiculous. The land reforms were unpopular. They were promulgating these so-called revolutionary decrees which they wanted to implement by force. Society wasn’t ready. People hadn’t been consulted.”
* Afghanistan, poor and unequal extreme land inequality typical of pre-revolutionary Mexico or China.
* Steele explained presents “linked to their landlord by ties of religion, clan and family and were unready to flout his authority.”
* 1979, the Afghan communist government made thirteen requests for Soviet military intervention
* Gave all the correct reasons for not deploying ground troops. “We have carefully studied all aspects of this action and come to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve but would worsen,” explained one Soviet official.
* \*\*Soviet Special Forces attacked the presidential palace, and in a long, bloody room-to-room gun battle they finally cornered and killed the president
* Soviets sent a wave of idealistic civilian advisers and technicians.
* Karmal proved to be incapable of winning the allegiance of rural Muslims, so the capacity of the Afghan state remained limited
* make matters worse, since July 1979 the United States had been arming the seven parties of the mujahedeen
* the considerable covert military assistance provided by the US was initiated by the CIA, funded by Saudi Government and Pakistan’s increasingly powerful Inter-Services Intelligence
* Russian were bogged down in war that take 9 years to terminate
* Soviet believed in their” international duty” just like the US volunteer
* The 40th Army’s real goal was to win hearts and minds
* \*\*\* Kalinovsky notes, “Moscow’s Afghan policy was defined by an effort to end the war without sustaining a defeat…. Gorbachev was almost as concerned as his predecessors about the damage a hasty Soviet withdrawal might do to Soviet prestige, particularly among his Third World partners. Yet Gorbachev was also committed to ending the war, and for the most part had the support of his Politburo to do so. This meant looking for new approaches to developing a viable regime in Kabul that could outlast the presence of Soviet troops.”
* Reagan administration was divided between “bleeders” and “dealers.”
* \*\*Secretary of State George Shultz was, at one point, a central “dealer” and argued for meeting the Soviets halfway: if the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan, the United States should, the dealers believed, cut off aid to the mujahedeen. On the other hand, the bleeders, heavily represented in the CIA and the Congressional “Afghan lobby,” were out for more blood and insisted that aid to the mujahedeen would end only when all aid to the Najibullah government stopped
* Bleeder won
* View from Moscow and Kabul, Reagan Administration position was “completely uncooperative.”